Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) were meant to solve the failures of signature-based detection tools. Yet today’s array of IOC standards, feeds, and products have hardly impeded attackers, and most intelligence remains shared in flat lists of hashes, IP addresses, domain names, or strings. Just as brittle as an anti-virus signature, and just as likely to fail – especially if used incorrectly.
This presentation will begin by contrasting the original intended design of IOCs with how they’re typically written and shared today. We’ll illustrate the challenges of building robust and reliable indicators, particularly when they need to be shared with 3rd parties. We’ll examine how organizations can compensate for these limitations and still get actionable results from brittle threat data. Finally, we’ll provide examples of endpoint outlier analysis and hunting techniques that can complement IOC searches and distinguish anomalies from the background noise of an environment.
Throughout the presentation, we’ll draw upon specific examples and lessons learned from responding to targeted attackers in real-world compromises.